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Abstract
There is a large and growing literature that studies the e⁄ects of weak enforcement insti-
tutions on economic performance. This literature has focused almost exclusively on primary
markets, in which assets are issued and traded to improve the allocation of investment and
consumption. The general conclusion is that weak enforcement institutions impair the workings
of these markets, giving rise to various ine¢ ciencies.
But weak enforcement institutions also create incentives to develop secondary markets, in
which the assets issued in primary markets are retraded. This paper shows that trading in
secondary markets counteracts the e⁄ects of weak enforcement institutions and, in the absence
of further frictions, restores e¢ ciency.
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Markets cannot exist without an adequate institutional framework that ensures that asset payments
are enforced. Most market transactions involve the exchange of explicit or implicit promises of a
future delivery of goods. More often than not, there is a date in which the ￿rst party of the
transaction has already complied with his obligations but is still waiting for the second party to do
so. At this point, the ￿rst party cannot trust the good will of the second party but must instead rely
on public or private enforcement institutions to do their job and force the second party to comply
with her obligations too. Otherwise, the ￿rst party would not have purchased the asset in the ￿rst
place and the transaction would never have happened. The logic of this argument is compelling
and has been known for a long time. And yet it is only recently that economists have started to pay
serious attention to the e⁄ects of weak institutions and developed a large and growing literature
that deals with this topic.1
This literature seems to have overlooked though some important e⁄ects that weak institutions
have on markets. In particular, the focus of existing research has been almost exclusively on how
weak institutions impair the workings of primary markets where assets are issued and traded to
improve the allocation of investment and consumption. But weak institutions also create incentives
to develop secondary markets where the assets issued in primary markets are retraded so as to
solve enforcement problems. For instance, in Broner, Martin and Ventura (2006), we showed how
secondary markets can support the optimal amount of foreign trade even in situations in which the
problem of sovereign risk is so severe that no foreign trade would be possible in their absence.
The goal of this short paper is to further explore the role of secondary markets in solving
enforcement problems. Given the tight space constraints, we cannot provide a full treatment of the
issues. Instead, we work with a simple setup that helps connect all the ideas minimizing notation
and formalities. This setup is the Debtor world, and it is as follows:
De￿nition 1 (The Debtor world). The Debtor world lasts two periods, Today and Tomorrow,
indexed by t 2 f0;1g; and contains a region named Debtor and an international ￿nancial market.
There is a continuum with mass one of debtors (i.e. residents of Debtor), indexed by i 2 I, that
maximize U(ci0;ci1) = u(ci0) + E0 [u(ci1)]; where cit is the consumption of debtor i in period t,
u0(￿) > 0 and u00(￿) ￿ 0. Today, debtors receive an endowment of 0:5 ￿ y. Tomorrow, half of them
are lucky and receive an endowment of 2￿y, while the rest are unlucky and receive an endowment of
y. Today, all debtors are equally likely to be lucky or unlucky. The international ￿nancial market
acts competitively, is risk neutral, does not discount the future, has deep pockets, can commit to
1See Dixit (2006) for a short introduction.
1make payments Tomorrow, and is therefore able and willing to buy or sell any asset o⁄ering zero
expected return.
In the Debtor world, debtors want to go to the international ￿nancial market to insure against
endowment risk Tomorrow and also to borrow and increase consumption Today. Without enforce-
ment problems, the price of a state-contingent bond that pays one unit of consumption Tomorrow
when debtor i is lucky (henceforth an ￿i-lucky￿bond) would be 0:5 since this is the probability
that this debtor be lucky. Similarly, the price of a state-contingent bond that pays one unit of
consumption Tomorrow when debtor i is unlucky (henceforth an ￿i-unlucky￿bond) would also be
0:5. These prices are independent of who issues these bonds, which could be debtor i himself or
somebody else.2 Taking this into account, debtor i￿ s budget set can be written as follows:























i0 stand for the debtor i￿ s holdings of i-lucky and i-unlucky bonds, respectively.3
The ￿rst-order conditions of debtor i￿ s maximization problem are:
u0 (ci0) = u0 (ci1 jlucky) = u0 (ci1 junlucky) (2)
The budget set and the ￿rst-order conditions jointly determine consumptions and the trades that
support them. Debtors choose to smooth consumption, i.e. ci0 = ci1 = y; and to implement this
consumption plan they borrow 0:5 ￿ y Today and promise to pay y Tomorrow if they are lucky, i.e.
x
Li
i0 = ￿y and x
Ui
i0 = 0.
The problem, of course, is that Tomorrow lucky debtors will prefer not to make payments to
the international ￿nancial market. The question we address here is whether Debtor￿ s government
will enforce these payments and what role, if any, secondary markets play in solving enforcement
problems.4 In Section 2, we consider a situation in which Debtor￿ s government acts opportunisti-
cally and is unwilling to enforce payments to the international ￿nancial market. This is the classic
problem of sovereign risk that we analyzed in Broner, Martin and Ventura (2006). In Section 3, we
consider instead a situation in which Debtor￿ s court system is imperfect and might be unable to
2Throughout, we assume that enforcement of asset payments involving a debtor are always decided by Debtor￿ s
government. This assumption streamlines the presentation since it ensures that bonds issued by debtors and the
international ￿nancial markets are perfect substitutes. None of the results of this paper depends on this assumption.
3Naturally, this debtor could choose from a much larger set of assets. But it would not be able to improve upon
what he/she can already do with these two state-contingent bonds.
4We assume that the only enforcement institutions are public. See Dixit (2007) for a wide-ranging discussion of
private enforcement institutions.
2enforce all payments. The analysis of this problem of weak law enforcement is new to this paper.
We show how, in each case, secondary markets solve the relevant enforcement problem allowing
debtors to smooth their consumption.
Trading in secondary markets plays di⁄erent roles in these examples however. While in the
sovereign-risk example this trading provides incentives to the government to enforce payments, in
the weak-law-enforcement example this trading insures individuals against unavoidable enforcement
errors. In Section 3, we also show that these roles are compatible and secondary markets can cope
with both types of enforcement problems simultaneously. We conclude in Section 4 with a discussion
of when and why secondary markets might fail to solve enforcement problems.
2 Unwillingness to enforce and secondary markets
Sovereign risk arises if countries act strategically or opportunistically when deciding whether to
enforce debt payments to foreigners, thus creating the possibility of default. There is a long-
standing tradition of thinking about this problem as being one of insu¢ cient collateral or penalties.5
If this insu¢ ciency is known ex-ante, sovereign risk constraints credit as foreigners understand that
countries will not repay their foreign debts if they exceed the value of penalties and collateral. If
this insu¢ ciency is partly discovered ex-post, sovereign risk leads countries to default when the
value of penalties and collateral falls short of their foreign debts. Both credit constraints and
defaults generate ine¢ ciencies that lower welfare. According to this traditional view, the ￿cure￿
for sovereign risk is to create enough collateral and penalties.
In Broner, Martin and Ventura (2006), we proposed an alternative (but complementary) view
of the problem of sovereign risk as one of missing markets. Implicitly or explicitly, the previous
literature has assumed that secondary markets are missing. But this assumption turns out to be
crucial since, even if the amount of collateral and penalties is arbitrarily small, foreign creditors can
always go to secondary markets to sell their debts and circumvent the strategic or opportunistic
behavior of governments. According to this alternative view, sovereign risk is only a problem if
secondary markets do not work well and its cure simply consists of improving them. We brie￿ y
review this argument next within the context of our simple Debtor world.
Assume that Debtor￿ s government chooses enforcement to maximize the average utility of
debtors. This can be achieved by committing Today to enforce all payments Tomorrow. The
5By collateral we refer to the value of the real assets that foreign creditors can directly seize in the event of default.
By penalties we refer to the value of the payments that foreign creditors can elicit in the event of deafult through
the threat of applying penalties of various sorts, including trade embargoes and losses of reputation. Conceptually,
collateral and penalties play the same role in the theory and therefore makes sense to treat them jointly.
3problem is that Debtor￿ s government lacks credibility and any promise it makes Today is rightly
discounted by market participants. Assume further that Debtor cannot o⁄er collateral and the
international ￿nancial market cannot impose penalties. Conventional wisdom suggests that in this
situation only domestic trade is possible. The reason for this seems straightforward: once Tomor-
row arrives, Debtor￿ s government will never enforce payments from debtors to the international
￿nancial market. Doing so would reduce the consumption of debtors and, due to the lack of col-
lateral and penalties, it would not provide any bene￿ts in return. Anticipating default Tomorrow,
the international ￿nancial market does not lend to debtors Today.6
The main result in our previous paper is that this apparently ￿ awless logic hinges on the implicit
assumption that there are no secondary markets. In conventional models, individuals trade Today
in primary markets but cannot trade again Tomorrow in secondary markets before enforcement
takes place. And yet we showed that if we opened these secondary markets, individuals would
actively trade in them with the unexpected consequence of eliminating the problem of sovereign
risk.
To see this, assume that the international ￿nancial market ignores sovereign risk and purchases
from each debtor i an amount y of i-lucky bonds at price 0:5 in primary markets. Would this
be rational behavior given that Debtor￿ s government acts opportunistically and there is neither
collateral nor penalties? The answer is positive if the secondary market works well. Since Debtor￿ s
government will never enforce payments from debtors to the international ￿nancial market, the
latter will be willing to sell all i-lucky bonds at any positive price. If Debtor￿ s government enforces
payments between debtors, these will be willing to buy i-lucky bonds at face value.7 In equilibrium,
all debts will be repaid. Naturally, we have derived this result under the assumption that Debtor￿ s
government enforces payments between debtors. But it is easy to see that this is actually not
an assumption, but an equilibrium outcome. After the secondary market closes, all bonds are
in the hands of debtors and default can only redistribute consumption among them increasing
inequality and lowering average utility. Therefore, the government prefers to enforce payments
between debtors.
It is worth introducing a bit of notation to expand on this last point. Let xL
i1 be debtor i￿ s net
holdings of bonds issued by lucky debtors after trading in the secondary market. If the government
enforces, all debtors consume y. If the government does not enforce, debtor i consumes y minus
xL
i1. Debtor￿ s government enforces if the average utility under enforcement is equal or greater than
6This would not prevent domestic residents from insuring each other though. Insurance payments are made by
lucky debtors and received by unlucky. Since the former have lower marginal utility of consumption than the latter,
these payments raise average utility and would be enforced by the government. Without secondary markets, all
debtors would consume 0:5 ￿ y Today and 1:5 ￿ y Tomorrow regardless of whether they are lucky or unlucky.
7If debtor i is unlucky, the face value of an i-lucky bond is zero.






Since all outstanding bonds are bought back in the secondary market, i.e.
R
i2I xL
i1 = 0, and
preferences are concave, i.e. u00(￿) ￿ 0, this inequality must hold in equilibrium. Therefore, any
distribution of bond holdings that satis￿es
R
i2I xL
i1 = 0 equates demand and supply in the secondary
market and ensures that all debt payments are enforced.
The key insight of this example is that secondary markets allow market participants to protect
themselves against the unwillingness of governments to enforce payments. By transferring assets
from those that are less liked by Debtor￿ s government (the international ￿nancial market) to those
that are more liked (debtors) secondary markets maximize the cost of default and lead the gov-
ernment to enforce all bonds. The optimal consumption plan can therefore be implemented.9 To
prove this result we have assumed that Debtor￿ s government can costlessly enforce payments if it
is willing to do so. Would secondary markets also be able to solve a situation in which Debtor￿ s
government does not have this ability? We turn to this question next.
3 Inability to enforce and secondary markets
Many enforcement problems do not stem from governments￿unwillingness to enforce payments but
instead from their inability to do so. As Avinash Dixit explains:
￿In all countries through much of their history, the apparatus of state law was very
costly, slow, unreliable, biased, corrupt, weak, or simply absent. In most countries this
situation still prevails. Markets with such weak underpinnings of law di⁄er greatly from
those depicted in conventional economic theory.￿Dixit (2004, p.3)
We entirely agree with Dixit￿ s diagnosis of the problem. The last sentence is ambiguous, though,
and lends itself to two alternative interpretations. Both take as the reference point countries with
strong law enforcement where markets play the role of allocating investments and consumption
e¢ ciently. The ￿rst interpretation, (and surely the one that Dixit had in mind) is that weak
law enforcement impairs the workings of primary markets leading to an ine¢ cient allocation of
8This condition is valid under the assumption that Debtor￿ s government cannot discriminate among debtors when
choosing enforcement policy. This assumption simpli￿es the exposition but is not crucial for the argument. See
Broner, Martin and Ventura (2006).
9How robust is the result that secondary markets solve the problem of unwillingness to enforce? In our previous
paper, we showed that it does not depend on the particular form of the government￿ s objective function and it extends
to environments with many regions, many periods, many shocks, most exogenous types of market incompleteness,
and many sources of heterogeneity within and between regions.
5investment and consumption. The second interpretation (and the one we shall emphasize here)
is that weak law enforcement provides incentives for the creation of secondary markets with the
alternative role of solving enforcement problems.
We return to our familiar Debtor world to make this point. To emphasize the di⁄erence be-
tween unwillingness and inability to enforce, we assume now that Debtor￿ s government can credibly
commit Today to try to enforce payments Tomorrow. This eliminates the problem of sovereign risk
discussed in Section 2. However, enforcement is carried out by courts and these work imperfectly.
3.1 Enforcement breakdown
Assume next that there is a probability ￿ 2 [0;1) that the court system collapses and no asset
payments are enforced. Although extreme, this example is useful because it clearly illustrates the
e⁄ects of secondary markets when governments are unable to enforce.
Consider ￿rst the usual case in which, for unspeci￿ed reasons, secondary markets are missing.
Given our assumptions about the international ￿nancial market, the price of i-lucky (i-unlucky)
bonds must be 0:5 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) since this is the probability that both debtor i be lucky (unlucky) and
there be no enforcement breakdown.10 Therefore, the budget set of debtor i can be written now as
follows:
ci0 = 0:5 ￿
￿










> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
2 ￿ y + x
Li
i0 if lucky, enforcement
2 ￿ y if lucky, no enforcement
y + x
Ui
i0 if unlucky, enforcement
y if unlucky, no enforcement
(3)
and the ￿rst-order conditions of the maximization problem of debtor i are:
u0 (ci0) = u0 (ci1 jlucky, enforcement) = u0 (ci1 junlucky, enforcement) (4)
Comparing Equations (3) and (4) with Equations (1) and (2), we ￿nd that consumption is no longer
smooth across dates and states of nature. Debtors now face enforcement risk and are forced to
consume their endowment in case of enforcement breakdown. As a result, Tomorrow￿ s consumption
becomes uncertain and borrowing declines.
This example shows how enforcement risk lowers the quality of existing assets and leads to
suboptimal outcomes. Debtors would like to transfer wealth from states in which they are lucky
10Here we are using the assumption (in Footnote 2) that all asset payments involving debtors are enforced in
Debtor￿ s courts. In particular, this means that when there is an enforcement breakdown the international ￿nancial
system does not make asset payments.
6to Today, but state-contingent bonds only allow them to transfer wealth from states in which they
are lucky and there is no enforcement breakdown to Today. The weaker law enforcement is, the
larger the distance between the asset that debtors need and the one that markets really o⁄er, even
though both assets might look the same on paper.
But this conclusion crucially relies on the unjusti￿ed assumption that secondary markets are
missing. If those markets were available, debtors would use them to insure against the possibility
of an enforcement breakdown. To see this, assume now that secondary markets open Tomorrow
after endowments are known and before enforcement takes place. At this time, market participants
know who is lucky and who is not. Given our assumptions about the international ￿nancial market,
i-lucky (i-unlucky) bonds will be traded in secondary markets at prices 1 ￿ ￿ and 0 (0 and 1 ￿ ￿)
depending on whether debtor i is lucky or unlucky, respectively. At these actuarially fair prices, all
debtors prefer to fully insure themselves so that they consume the same amount regardless of en-
forcement. They achieve this by using secondary markets to undo their net positions. Anticipating
these trades, the budget set of debtor i Today can be written as follows:
ci0 = 0:5 ￿
￿












2 ￿ y + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ x
Li
i0 if lucky




and the ￿rst-order conditions of his maximization problem are now:
u0 (ci0) = u0 (ci1 jlucky) = u0 (ci1 junlucky) (6)
The e⁄ect of secondary markets can be seen by comparing the budget sets in Equations (3) and
(5). Now debtors can issue bonds that de facto pay whenever they are lucky regardless of whether
enforcement breaks down. Therefore, as long as the probability of enforcement is positive, debtors









In this example, enforcement risk results from the possibility of complete enforcement break-
down. We turn next to a less extreme case in which there is always enforcement, but enforcement
risk results from courts making mistakes when deciding which payments are to be enforced.
3.2 Enforcement mistakes
Assume now that courts make mistakes. In particular, there is a probability ￿ 2 [0;0:5) that courts
will declare a lucky debtor to be unlucky, and viceversa.
Once again, we start with the case in which secondary markets are missing. Given our assump-
7tions about the international ￿nancial market, the price of i-lucky and i-unlucky bonds must be
both 0:5 since this is the probability that debtor i is declared lucky or unlucky by the courts.11
Therefore, the budget set of debtor i can be written now as follows:










> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
2 ￿ y + x
Li
i0 if lucky, declared lucky
2 ￿ y + x
Ui
i0 if lucky, declared unlucky
y + x
Li
i0 if unlucky, declared lucky
y + x
Ui
i0 if unlucky, declared unlucky
(7)
The ￿rst-order conditions of the maximization problem of debtor i are:
u0 (ci0) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ u0 (ci1 jlucky, declared lucky) + ￿ ￿ u0 (ci1 junlucky, declared lucky) (8)
= ￿ ￿ u0 (ci1 jlucky, declared unlucky) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ u0 (ci1 junlucky, declared unlucky)
Comparing Equations (7) and (8) with Equations (1) and (2), we ￿nd that consumption is no longer
smooth across dates and states of nature. Debtors now face both endowment and enforcement risks,
and it is not possible to insure against both of them by trading in primary markets alone. As a
result, Tomorrow￿ s consumption becomes uncertain and this might also a⁄ect debtors￿desire to
borrow. If u000 (￿) > 0, weak law enforcement reduces debtors￿borrowing. If u000 (￿) < 0, the opposite
occurs.
Once again, when secondary markets are missing enforcement risk lowers the quality of existing
assets and leads to suboptimal outcomes. In this case, Debtors would like to transfer wealth from
states in which they are lucky to Today, but state-contingent bonds only allow them to transfer
wealth from states in which courts declare them to be lucky to Today.
When secondary markets exist, on the other hand, debtors can use them to insure against en-
forcement mistakes. Anticipating this, debtors then use primary markets for their original purpose,
i.e. insuring against endowment risk and borrowing. To see this, assume that secondary markets
open Tomorrow after endowments are known and before enforcement takes place. At this time,
market participants know who is lucky and who is not. Given our assumptions about the inter-
national ￿nancial market, i-lucky (i-unlucky) bonds will be traded in secondary markets at prices
1 ￿ ￿ and ￿ (￿ and 1 ￿ ￿) depending on whether debtor i is lucky or unlucky, respectively.12 At
11Here we are using again the assumption (in Footnote 2) that all asset payments involving debtors are enforced in
Debtor￿ s courts. In particular, this means that payments on bonds issued by the international ￿nancial market are
also contingent on the rulings of Debtor￿ s courts.
12Even if the international market did not participate in secondary markets, the prices would be the same. The
reason is that debtors can diversify away the risk of any i-lucky bond and, as a result, this risk is not priced in
equilibrium.
8these actuarially fair prices, all debtors prefer to undo their portfolios in order to insure themselves
against enforcement mistakes. Taking these trades into account, the budget set of debtor i Today
becomes:
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i0 + ￿ ￿ x
Ui
i0 if lucky
y + ￿ ￿ x
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and the ￿rst-order conditions of his maximization problem are now:
u0 (ci0) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ u0 (ci1 jlucky) + ￿ ￿ u0 (ci1 junlucky) (10)
= ￿ ￿ u0 (ci1 jlucky) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ u0 (ci1 junlucky)
The e⁄ect of secondary markets can be seen by comparing the budget sets in Equations (7) and
(9). Now there exist combinations of bonds that deliver income in those states in which a debtor
is lucky or unlucky, regardless of what the courts declare. Secondary markets change the span of
existing assets in such a way that the budget set is una⁄ected by enforcement problems. Therefore,
debtors choose the optimal consumption plan, i.e. ci0 = ci1 = y. The only e⁄ect of enforcement
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1 ￿ 2 ￿ ￿
￿ y.
3.3 Discussion
These two examples illustrate how secondary markets help solve problems derived from the govern-
ment￿ s inability to enforce. The role of secondary markets is quite di⁄erent from that of primary
markets though. While the latter allow borrowing and provide insurance against endowment risk,
the former provide insurance against enforcement risk.
How robust is this result? Our setup captures just one aspect of these problems; namely, weak
law enforcement may generate random redistributions. However, the result is likely to apply also in
other situations. For example, consider the case in which enforcement entails high resource costs. In
this case, secondary markets enable individuals to undo their portfolios to save on enforcement costs.
It might seem also that secondary markets are not helpful if the apparatus of state law is absent.
But even then, secondary markets might help by leveraging private enforcement mechanisms.
Moreover, the roles of secondary markets in dealing with problems derived from governments￿
unwillingness and inability to enforce are compatible with each other and can be performed simul-
taneously. To see this, assume now that in the world of the previous section Debtor￿ s government
cannot commit Today to enforcing payments Tomorrow. This brings back the problem of sovereign
9risk. To eliminate this risk, the distribution of bond holdings that comes out of the secondary
market must be such that the government prefers to enforce payments. But, since debtors have in-
centives to insure themselves against enforcement mistakes, they undo their portfolios in secondary
markets. As a result, the average utility of debtors is una⁄ected by the government￿ s enforcement
decision and, thus, enforcing payments is consistent with government optimization.
4 What are enforcement problems?
This paper began with the assertion, which few economists would dispute, that markets cannot work
well without an adequate institutional framework that ensures that asset payments are enforced.
The results reported here, however, suggest an important twist to this argument. Weak enforcement
institutions interfere with the workings of primary markets only if secondary markets are missing
or do not function properly. Otherwise, assets issued in primary markets are retraded so as to
eliminate the e¢ ciency losses brought about by enforcement problems.
Since empirical evidence suggests that weak enforcement institutions do matter for economic
performance, it is important to understand when and why secondary markets cannot perform
this useful role. One possibility is that there exist additional frictions, unrelated to enforcement
problems, that prevent secondary markets from working well. In our previous paper, we identi￿ed
three such frictions: transaction costs, the presence of large agents, and the ability of governments
to commit to enforcing or not enforcing certain payments.13 A second possibility is that what we
call enforcement problems are nothing but symptoms of other, deeper, frictions that simultaneously
weaken enforcement institutions and impair the workings of secondary markets. A natural candidate
friction of this type is asymmeric information.14 Further progress on the e⁄ects of weak enforcement
institutions on economic outcomes will hinge on our collective ability to theoretically and empirically
explain why secondary markets often fail to solve enforcement problems in the real world.
13In particular, we showed how these frictions limit the e⁄ectiveness of secondary markets in solving the problem
of unwillingness to enforce. For lack of space, we do not repeat the analysis for the problem of inability to enforce,
even though many of the arguments developed in our earlier paper would also apply. Broner and Ventura (2005 and
2007) discuss at length the case in which governments can preempt secondary markets by committing to not enforcing
certain payments before individuals retrade existing contracts.
14A simple example makes the point. Consider the world of Subsection 3.2 with one slight variation: Tomorrow,
there is asymmetric information as to who has been lucky or unlucky, and it is up to the courts to verify it. As before,
￿ is the probability that courts make a mistake when verifying the status of an individual debtor. At ￿rst glance,
nothing has changed. All we have done is to justify enforcement mistakes as the consequence of another friction,
namely, asymmetric information. And yet this has crucial consequences because asymmetric information a⁄ects the
workings of secondary markets. Since the international ￿nancial market does not know who is lucky or unlucky, it
must o⁄er the same prices to both types of individuals. This gives rise to adverse selection in secondary markets,
making it too expensive for unlucky debtors to fully undo their portfolios and exposing them to enforcement risk in
equilibrium. In this case, secondary markets would still be used and this would raise welfare. But it is no longer
possible to attain the optimal consumption plan. The presence of asymmetric information that gives rise to default
risk also prevents secondary markets from eliminating it.
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